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Representing Knowledge: logical and philosophical approaches
This meeting is organized by the ANR-DFG funded project BEYOND LOGIC. The aim of the conference is to shed new light on epistemological issues related to knowledge representation. More precisely, the conference investigates how to extend logical analysis to extra-logical notions, such as knowledge, ignorance, belief formation and deception, with a particular focus on common knowledge, multi-agency, epistemic logic and many-valued logics.
- Paul Egré (IJN - ENS)
- Wiebe van der Hoek (University of Liverpool)
- Benjamin Icard (IJN - ENS)
- Manuel Križ (LSCP - ENS)
- Ekaterina Kubyshkina (IHPST - Paris 1)
- Heinrich Wansing (Ruhr University Bochum)
9:30 – 10:30 – Wiebe van der Hoek, Program models and semi-public environments
10:30 – 10:45 – coffee break
10:45 – 11:30 – Ekaterina Kubyshkina, Representing ignorance: a truth-functional approach
11:30 – 12:30 – Paul Egré, On logical consequence in many-valued logics
12:30 – 14:30 – lunch
14:30 – 15:30 – Heinrich Wansing, Three sources of knowledge
15:30 – 15:45 – coffee break
15:45 – 16:30 – Manuel Križ, A Trivalent Logic for Plural Predication
16:30 – 17:15 – Benjamin Icard, The ‘Surprise Deception Paradox’: a conceptual and logical insight into veridical deception
Titles and abstracts
Paul Egré (IJN - ENS)
On logical consequence in many-valued logics
Wiebe van der Hoek (University of Liverpool)
Program models and semi-public environments
Benjamin Icard (IJN - ENS)
The ‘Surprise Deception Paradox’: a conceptual and logical insight into veridical deception
Manuel Križ (LSCP - ENS)
A Trivalent Logic for Plural Predication
Ekaterina Kubyshkina (IHPST - Paris 1)
Representing ignorance: a truth-functional approach
Heinrich Wansing (Ruhr University Bochum)
Three sources of knowledge
Epistemologists distinguish between different kinds of knowledge, such as a priori knowledge, a posteriori knowledge, testimonial knowledge, perceptual knowledge, inference-based knowledge, etc. The two last-mentioned categories correspond with certain sources of knowledge and kinds of belief acquisition: perception and various forms of inference. In this talk I intend to consider three different sources of knowledge with corresponding methods of belief formation, namely imagination, proof, and dual proof. In a first step, I will present an axiom system and a tableau calculus for a propositional logic of imagination ascriptions. This logic combines a certain modal logic of agency, dstit-logic, with the neighbourhood semantics of non-normal modal logics.In a second step, I will present some thoughts on a formal analysis of the inferential actions of proof and dual proof. Such an analysis requires the consideration of a particular deductive system. The idea is to conceptualize inferring as seeing to it that one has a proof, respectively a dual proof, in the deductive system in question. The resulting modal inference operators can be added to Artemov andNogina's epistemic logic with justification.
- S. Artemov and E. Nogina, Introducing justification into epistemic logic, Journal of Logic and Computation 15, 2005, 1059-1073.
- G. Olkhovikov and H. Wansing, An axiom system and a tableau calculus for STIT imagination logic, 2015, submitted.
- H. Wansing, Falsification, natural deduction, and bi-intuitionistic logic, Journal of Logic and Computation 26, 2016, 425-450, published online July 2013, doi:10.1093/logcom/ext035.
- H. Wansing, Remarks on the logic of imagination. A step towards understanding doxastic control through imagination, Synthese, published online October 2015, doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0945-4.
- H. Wansing, On split negation, strong negation, information, falsification, and verification, in: K. Bimbó (ed.), J. Michael Dunn on Information Based Logics, Springer, to appear 2016.