Abstract: Logical pluralism is the thesis that there is more than one correct logic. This paper scrutinizes the debate over logical pluralism with the aim of enriching it and making it more tractable. Much of the literature has focused on `framework' issues. I will address a more pressing issue, viz. the question of motivating data: what would count as strong evidence in favor of logical pluralism? Clearly, any research program should be expected to answer this question, but many logical pluralists fall back on brute intuitions in the face of such challenges. This sets the view on a weak foundation and can certainly give the impression that nothing very pressing is at stake in the debate. In this paper, I look at a promising case study and consider what kind of lessons we can learn about evidence that would support logical pluralism. I argue that the most compelling motivation for logical pluralism would be a kind of performative data that suggests irreducible fragmentation of the standards of logical support. We find plausible examples of such data in science and mathematics.