Ongoing projects

Responsable (s) - WAGNER Pierre
OKADA Mitsu - Full Professor at Keio University's Department of Philosophy
Personnes(s) impliquée(s) - FICHOT Jean, NAIBO Alberto, PANZA Marco, PETROLO Mattia, CADET Méven
AKIYOSHI Ryota, ARAHATA Yasuhiro, KASHIWABATA Tatsuta, TAKAHASHI Yuta, BENOIST Jocelyn (Professeur de philosophie contemporaine et philosophie de la connaissance à l’Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne), MINESHIMA Koji (simulation science, Ochanomizu University), TERUI Kazuyuki (mathematical institute, Kyoto University), CODOGNET Philippe (Japanese French Laboratory for Informatics, Tokyo), JOINET Jean-Baptiste (Université Lyon 3).
Partenaire (s): Global Research Centre for Logic and Sensibility - Department of philosophy - Keio University
Financement(s) - PICS

It is usually assumed that logic is a normative science, as opposed to a descriptive science such as physics or biology. But what does that mean exactly? The answer will depend crucially on what logic actually is, and because modern logic has evolved dramatically from the time of Frege’s Begriffsschift (1879) to the present day, Frege’s classical conception of logical normativity cannot be ours anymore. This project is premised on the basic idea that the relationships between logic and computer science – more precisely: between logical proofs and computational programs – raise new issues about the very meaning of the normativity of logic.


Responsable (s) - FICHOT Jean
SCHROEDER-HEISTER Peter - Professeur à l'Université de Tübingen
Personnes(s) impliquée(s) - PÉGNY Maël, PETROLO Mattia, NAIBO Alberto
Financement(s) - Agence nationale de la recherche

In previous projects, we have investigated hypothetical reasoning from a logical point of view. This new project targets hypothetical reasoning in extra-logical areas. Our leading viewpoint is that logical investigations must prove useful outside logic, and conversely, that logical investigations must take into account the way logic is applied in the ‘real world’.

Responsable (s) - MOLTMANN Friederike
SEARLE John - University of Berkeley
Personnes(s) impliquée(s) - MISKIEWICZ Wioletta
Financement(s) - Fonds Berkeley

Social reality consists of objects constituted, at least in part, by the intentionality of agents. It is the intentionality of agents that conveys objects with functions, representational properties, truth or satisfaction conditions, and normativity.  This is a central theme in the work of John Searle on social reality.

Responsable (s) - PANZA Marco
Personnes(s) impliquée(s) - BREVINI Costanza , FICHOT Jean, KUBYSHKINA Ekaterina, NAIBO Alberto, POGGIOLESI Francesca, WAGNER Pierre
Davide Crippa (Univ. Paris 7)
Financement(s) - CAPES-COFECUB

Durant ces dernières années, « analyse logique » de la notion de preuve, qui s'est imposée tout au long du XXème siècle, a été remise en cause par des analyses d'ordre historique et conceptuel. En premier lieu, l'étude de cas de preuves paradigmatiques, tirées de l'histoire des mathématiques, offre une image extrêmement riche et variée des pratiques démonstratives existantes.

Responsable (s) - KISTLER Maximilian
Personnes(s) impliquée(s) - GAYON Jean, HUNEMAN Philippe, PRADEU Thomas, MANAFU Alexandru, GUAY Alexandre, RUPHY Stéphanie
LUDWIG Pascal - Université Paris 4 Sorbonne
Financement(s) - Agence nationale de la recherche - programme blanc

The aim of the Metascience project is to make a significant contribution to the metaphysics of science on the basis of the detailed analysis of key concepts in current experimental sciences, above all physics, biology and psychology. We understand “metaphysics of science” as the field of research whose objective is the analysis of the fundamental concepts structuring scientific research – e.g., those of individual, cause, or disposition. Our strategy is best understood in contrast with the dominant perspective in today’s metaphysics. Indeed, most research presently done within this field proceeds by pure conceptual analysis. This strategy of philosophical research is sometimes explicitly stated and defended. It corresponds to what Strawson (1959) has called “descriptive metaphysics,” which aims at making explicit the conceptual structure underlying common sense. 

Responsable (s) - HUNEMAN Philippe
Financement(s) - Germaine Tillion 2013

Aujourd’hui, le terme d’environnement est le dénominateur commun de discours et de pratiques dont ;on pense à première vue qu’ils portent sur le même objet. Pourtant, quoi de commun, exactement, entre protection de l’environnement, éthique environnementale, droit de l’environnement, interactions gènes-environnement, influence de l’environnement, dégradation de l’environnement via le changement climatique, ou encore le succinct et sibyllin « environnementalisme » ?

Le présent projet entend construire une analyse de ce qu’on pourrait nommer le champ de l’environnemental : repérer les convergences sémantiques, les équivocités, les différentes logiques discursives et les références à des cultures épistémiques distinctes traversant et structurant la pluralité des discours et pratiques qui sous une forme ou une ;autre se disent traiter de « l’environnement ». Il vise à contribuer à dissoudre un certain nombre d’incompréhensions ou de problèmes artificiels nés de la conflation de logiques ou de significations différentes, à formuler les problèmes spécifiques sur lesquels une vraie approche interdisciplinaire peut être construire, et enfin à identifier les ressources susceptibles d’être mobilisées pour les traiter.

Responsable (s) - MOSSIO Matteo
Financement(s) - Région Ile-de-France
Responsable (s) - PANZA Marco
Partenaire (s): Laboratoire d'Histoire des Sciences et de Philosophie - Archives Henri-Poincaré - Nancy
Financement(s) - Agence nationale de la recherche - deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft - programme franco-allemand

As far as the physical world is concerned, the standard realist attitude which conceives of objects as existing independently of our representations of them might be (prima facie) plausible: if things go well, we represent physical objects in the way we do because they are so-and-so.In contrast, as we want to argue, in the mathematical world the situation is reversed: if things go well, mathematical objects are so-and-so because we represent them as we do. This does not mean that mathematics could not be objective: mathematical representations might be subject to constraints that impose objectivity on what they constitute. If this is right, in order to understand the nature of mathematical objects we should first understand how mathematical representations work. In the words of Kreisel’s famous dictum: “the problem is not the existence of mathematical objects but the objectivity of mathematical statements” (Dummett 1978, p. xxxviii).

The problem we tackle concerns the philosophical question of clarifying the role of representations in mathematical reasoning and proofs and the way they contribute to mathematical ontology and understanding. This is a fresh inquiry concerning a classical problem in philosophy of mathematics connecting understanding to proofs and to the way the ontology of mathematic is conceived. But our starting point is neither classical proof theory nor classical metaphysics. We are rather looking at the problem by opening the door to the practical turn in science.

In our perspective the question is then neither to find a topic-neutral formalization of mathematical reasoning, nor to offer a new argument for the existence of mathematical objects. We rather wonder how appropriate domains of mathematical (abstract) objects are constituted, by appealing to different sorts of representations, and how appropriate reasoning on them are licensed.

Responsable (s) - HUNEMAN Philippe
Financement(s) - Agence nationale de la recherche - programme blanc

EXPLABIO aims at investigating modes of explanations in evolutionary biology, in order to assess current attempts to extend or revise the classical framework (elaborated in 1930-1950) called “Modern Synthesis,” that was centered on the crucial explanatory role of population genetics as the science of the process of evolution by natural selection. We assume that recent advances in ecology, molecular biology and evolutionary theory of development ("Evo-Devo") are characterized by novel explanatory structures and features, that call for a new account of the explanatory nature of evolutionary biology. EXPLABIO will elaborate such account.
For evolutionary biologists, the space of explanations is structured along two axes, namely the two questions: “How does selection proceed?”, and “why is there selection; then a third axis concerns the mechanistic or topological character of explanations – « topological » meaning here the explanatory character of a set of properties of an abstract structure (like the a phase space, or a fitness landscape) associated to the system under study. EXPLABIO will build this space in details, achieving four interconnected tasks : investigating the explananda of natural selection as population-level explanation; exploring the modes of topological explanation at different levels and their articulation with mechanistic explanation; questioning the status of neutral processes and neutral networks as pervasive explanatory tools in ecology (i.e. Hubbell’s “neutral theory of ecology”) and evolution (i.e. Kimura’s neutralist theory of molecular evolution), and thereby the explanatory status of neutrality and randomness; and finally, addressing the role of time- and space-scale decoupling and coupling in the definition of explananda and the choice of models.

Responsable (s) - GAYON Jean, HUNEMAN Philippe

Fondé en 2005, ce consortium réunit chaque année des chercheurs et doctorants des quatre universités. Il a eu à ce jour trois réunions scientifiques : Montréal (2006), Paris (2007), Toronto (2008), la prochaine réunion étant programmée pour 2008 à Duke. Le programme a eu pour effet de nombreux stages de chercheurs et de doctorants, des soutenances de thèses communes.