Nous vous informons qu'une conférence est organisée par Can Baskent le 6 février à 14h à l'IHPST. Emmanuel Genot (University of Lund) interviendra sur "Inquiry by Other Names".
Hintikka has argued that the main problem of question-driven inquiry is: "Given the list of the propositions one has reached in a line of inquiry, which question should one ask next?"1. When we can treat all answers we receive as true (even for the sake of the argument), Hintikka claims that this problem is strategically equivalent to the following problem for deductive logic: "Which proposition should one use as the premise of the next logical inference?" [ibid.] If Hinitkka is right, then contrary to a widespread view, at least some contexts of discovery are amenable to logical means. In the first part of my talk, I will present (informally) arguments based on algorithmic learning-theoretic approaches to inquiry which support Hintikka's conclusion. In the second part, I will lend support to another conclusion of Hintikka's, namely that his model of inquiry yields a "general theory of reasoning", by showing its ability to explain experimental data on reasoning tasks, usually thought to be impervious to logical models. I will conclude that Hintikka's Interrogative model of Inquiry (IMI) is actually a sophisiticated model of "interrogative learning" and more generally an empirically adequate model of reasoning.
1 Hintikka, "Presuppositions and other limitations of inquiry", in Socratic Epistemology, 2007, CUP, p.98