Séance commune du séminaire Metascience de l'IHPSt et du département de philosophie de l'ENSautour d'Alan Sokal (Département de physique, New York University) qui anime une discussion intitulée "Does science make metaphysical assumptions?".
Des notes informelles à propos du livre The Comprehensibility of the Universe, de Nicholas Maxwell.
Ceux qui souhaitent avoir communication des chapitres de l'ouvrage qui seront discutés peuvent les demander à Max Kistler ou à Sophie Roux.
Dans le cadre du projet de recherche (ANR) "Metaphysique des Sciences", nous recevons Olivier Sartenaer (Université de Louvain) sur « L'unité plurielle de l'émergence et les niveaux de réalité ».
Vous êtes cordialement invité(e)s d'assister à la prochaine séance du séminaire Métascience (Projet ANR Métascience) le mardi 17 decembre 2013 à 16h30 à l'IHPST.
Martin Schüle intervient sur "The Kocher-Specker Theorem: A Case for the Emergence of Space-Time?"
Résumé:
"In quantum physics, events can exhibit long-range correlations although there is no direct contact between them and no common cause. These so-called nonlocal correlations between space-like separated events are a central issue in quantum information science and the foundational and philosophical debate in quantum physics.
Bell's analysis of the situation led to a no-go theorem which says that it is not possible to introduce additional variables, with certain intuitive properties, that would explain the correlations. After discussing certain conceptual difficulties with Bell's theorem, I will discuss another no-go theorem by Kochen and Specker. I will claim that the Kocher-Specker theorem is more fundamental and will allow for a Bell-type argument involving time-like separated events instead of space-like separated ones. This might provide some evidence that the structure of space-time is an emerging phenomenon in nature."
Carlo Rovelli (Marseille) et Vincent Lam (Lausanne)
Nous aurons le plaisir de recevoir Mathias Frisch (U. du Maryland) sur le sujet "Causal Reasoning in Physics".
Abstract
Many contemporary philosophers of physics (and philosophers ofscience more general)y follow Bertrand Russell in arguing that there is no room for causal notions in physics. Causation, as James Woodward has put it, has a 'human face', which makes causal notions sit ill with fundamental theories of physics. In this talk I examine a range of anti-causal arguments and show that the portrait that the neo-Russellians paint of causation is the face of scientific representations much more generally. Causal notions, I argue, play no less of an important role in physics than they do in other sciences. I begin by focusing on classical physics. If time permits, I will also discuss examples from quantum physics.