Dynamique de la pensée de se
My main goal with my research is to provide an account of the dynamics of mental acts in the specific case of thoughts apprehended in the perspective of the first person – proposing thus the sketch of a theory for the dynamics of the so-called de se thoughts. On the basis of this project lies a theory of the senses of simple terms and complex sentences inspired by the work of Gottlob Frege on language. My intention is to approach such a semantic theory from a dynamic point of view, as it has already been done by authors like Jérôme Dokic; besides defending it from criticisms arising from direct reference theories. The phenomenon of the dynamics of thought shall be presented in its key features, and some of its greatest difficulties shall be discussed, analyzing critically previous attempts to explain the phenomenon in the literature. Already at this point I mean to sketch a general proposal of explanation to the dynamics of thinking. Due to its importance in accounting for cognitive dynamics in general, as well as the dynamics of I-thoughts in particular, the phenomenon of indexicality that affects certain linguistic expressions will be examined at some length. I will also suggest a dynamic approach to the semantics of this kind of expression. Lastly, I intend to resort to the literature on intentional states in the first person to show the specificity of de se thinking when confronted with de re and de dicto thoughts. In addition, I shall discuss from a the point of view of a dynamic semantics some of the most important characteristics of I-thoughts, recurring to suggestions inspired mainly by the works of Jérôme Dokic, Gareth Evans and François Recanati. With that theoretical background, I expect to be able to finally offer a satisfying explanation of the mechanisms involved in the dynamics of de se thinking.
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