Alexius Meinong starts his theory of objects, Gegenstandstheorie, by saying that "the totality of what exists including what existed and will exist, is infinitely small in comparison with the totality of the Objects of knowledge". For him, a proper science of Objects should take into account the objects that are real (wirklich) and exist (existieren), the ideal objects that subsist (bestehen) and the objects that neither exist nor subsist like golden mountain and round square. The Meinongian cartography of objects bring about in some cases seemingly insurmountable semantical difficulties as it is the case for the negative existential propositions involving singular non-referring terms. Semantical distinction between “to be” and “to exist”, central to Gegenstandstheorie, is a problematic issue for certain understanding of Ontology, inspired mainly by Quine. This thesis is concerned with Meinongianism from semantical, ontological and meta-ontological point of view.
